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Notes
WRIGHT LINE AND WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
ACTIONS: A UNIFORM STANDARD OF
REVIEW
An increasingnumber of courts are recognizingthe right of an employee who is
not apartyto an employment contractor a collective bargainingagreement to maintain a 'wrongful discharge" action againsthis employer. The rapidlygrowing body
ofcase lawpertainingto wrongful discharge,although signifying ajust(fleddeparture
from the rigid common law terminable at will rule, isplaguedby inconsistency and
confusion. Most notably, courts are split on the legal theory of wrongful discharge--4ortor contract--andconsistentlyfail to give adequate considerationto the
sign fcant employee and employer interestsimplicatedby wrongful dischargeclaims.
This Note thereforeproposesa unform standardofjudicialreviewfor wrongful discharge actions. The suggested standardis derivedfrom the test espoused by the
NationalLabor RelationsBoardin Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc.,
presently used by both the Board and courts of appeals to resolve claims alleging
anti-union motivated dischargeunder the NationalLabor RelationsAct. The author
of the Note maintains that Wright Line will remedy the currentproblems with the
law of wrongful dischargebyproviding an analyticalframeworkwithin which wrongful discharge claims may be consistently evaluatedand relevant employee and employer interestsconsidered

INTRODUCTION

AT COMMON LAW, employees not covered by employment
contracts' or collective bargaining agreements are terminable
at will.2 Historically, at will 3 employees were not protected from
1. The employment contract must be of fixed duration for an employee to be considered nonterminable at will. A contract for "permanent employment," considered to be of
indefinite duration, results in a terminable at will relationship. See, e.g., Bixby v. Wilson &
Co., 196 F. Supp. 889, 898 (N.D. Iowa 1961).
2. The terminable at will rule is well established at American common law. In Adair
v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), the Supreme Court held that the employer's right to
discharge could not be limited by federal legislation. The Court stated that "the right of
the employee to quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the
right of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of the employee."
Id. at 174-75. Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court recognized that Congress had
the power to prevent employers from discriminatorily discharging employees. NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The Court expanded this view in Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941), holding that an employer cannot refuse to hire
or reinstate an individual based on his union membership. Jones & Laughlin and Phelps
Dodge upheld the validity of the National Labor Relations Act, passed by Congress in
1935. Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-198 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)). Congress further modified the terminable at will rule during the 1960's
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arbitrary dismissal by their employers. 4 Recently, however, a
growing number of courts5 have allowed at will employees to sue
their employers for wrongful, abusive, or retaliatory discharge.6
These courts recognize overriding public and private policy interests which compel modification of the traditional rule.7 In support

of this view, commentators focus on the inevitability of social progress,8 changing economic conditions,9 and the need to correct
historical inequities between employers and employees. 1° Al-

though recognition of a wrongful discharge cause of action appears to represent the trend in scholarly opinion and case law, the
state of the law is uncertain."

This Note examines the current status of wrongful discharge
actions and proposes a uniform standard of review. Section I sets
forth the judicial views, 2 explores the two legal theories under
which wrongful discharge actions are recognized-contract1 3 and
tort 4 ---and concludes that tort theory is the most workable and
with legislation designed to protect against discriminatory hiring and firing practices. See,
e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 703 (a), 78 Stat. 241, 255
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) (prohibiting discharge from employment based
on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
3. For purposes of this Note, "at will" refers to employees not covered by collective
bargaining agreements or fixed-term employment contracts.
4. See supra note 2.
5. See infra note 23.
6. Some courts use these terms interchangeably. See, e.g., Palmateer v. International
Harvester Co., 85 IMI.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IM.2d
172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). The most prevalent term seems to be wrongful discharge. See,
e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981);
Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959);
Harless v. First Natl Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978). Throughout this Note, the term
wrongful discharge refers to dismissal from at will employment based on bad faith, retaliation, or otherwise tainted motives of the employer.
7. See infra notes 105-21 and accompanying text.
8. See Peck, Unjust Dischargesfrom Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law,
40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 42 (1979) (imposition of a good faith requirement on employers mandates judicial creativity if the common law is to be adapted to society's changing
conditions).
9. See Note, ProtectingAt Will EmployeesAgainst Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in GoodFaith, 93 HARv. L. Rlv. 1816 (1980), analyzing the negative economic impact of changing the at will rule and concluding that such impact may be exaggerated and will be absorbed easily.
10. See Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedon" On Limiting the Abusive
ExerciseofEmployer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967). This seminal article provides
a comprehensive social, philosophical, and legal analysis supporting the recognition of
wrongful discharge actions in tort.
11. See infra notes 23-103 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 23-51 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 55-89 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.
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appropriate.1 5 Section II surveys the factual situations presented
by wrongful discharge actions, concentrating on the employer and
employee interests at stake. 6 It is asserted that an informal standard of protected employee conduct exists, 7 and that employers'
interests should be given significant weight by the courts. 8
The final section of the Note proposes a uniform standard of
review for wrongful discharge cases' 9 analogous to the test in
Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc.20 This test is used by

the National Labor Relations Board to determine whether disciplinary actions and dismissals are motivated by anti-union animus. 2 Applied to wrongful discharge actions, the Wright Line
test will balance the interests of all parties and provide a manageable tool for judicial decisionmaking.Y1
I.

CURRENT STATUS

The number of jurisdictions recognizing a wrongful discharge
cause of action is increasing.2 3 Courts addressing the issue take
15. See infra notes 52-103 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 105-43 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 105-21 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 122-43 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 144-89 and accompanying text.
20. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 989 (1982).
21. See infra notes 153-66 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 167-89 and accompanying text.
23. See Maus v. National Living Centers, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982).
Maus collects wrongful discharge cases by state, finding that ten states unequivocally recognize a cause of action and eight more have not rejected it completely. Id. at 676-77 n. 1.
States expressly recognizing a wrongful discharge cause of action are California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, and
West Virginia. Those which have not rejected wrongful discharge actions completely are
Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington.
Although Maus provides the most comprehensive and convincing listing, some commentators assert that significantly more jurisdictions recognize wrongful discharge actions. See
Travis, Abusive-Discharge Cases to Test Common Law Rule, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 24, 1982, at I
(stating that an independent count revealed 27 jurisdictions allowing wrongful discharge
actions); Harmon & Kolko, Development in the Law CoveringAbusive Discharges,N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 26, 1982, at 1 (citing a New York City Bar Association study concluding that approximately 14 jurisdictions recognize wrongful discharge actions).
Since Maus, Alaska, Hawaii, and Wisconsin apparently have recognized wrongful discharge actions. Mitford v. de Lasaa, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983); Pamar v. Americana
Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Hawaii 1982); Brockmeyer v. Dunn & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d
561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983). The Alaska and Hawaii courts reversed the grant of an employer's mdtion for summary judgment, remanding for further factual inquiry. The Wisconsin court recognized wrongful discharge actions generally, but not on the facts before it.
Prior to Maus, lower courts in New York were congenial to recognition of wrongful discharge. See Fletcher v. Greiner, 106 Misc. 2d 564, 435 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1980);
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three positions. A number of courts recognize wrongful discharge

actions, in a variety of factual situations, as an exception to terminable at will rule.24 These courts base their analyses on both con-

tract and tort theories.25 Other courts reject wrongful discharge
actions on the facts before them, but state that other factual set-

tings may dictate a different result. 26 Finally, some courts emphatically reject any modification of or exception to an employer's
right to discharge an at will employee.2 7
Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1979), af'dmem.,
74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327, appealdismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433
N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980); Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d
737 (Sup. Ct. 1978), aff'dmem, 70 A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160, appealdenied, 48 N.Y.2d
603, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1979). Recently, however, the New York Court of Appeals refused to recognize wrongful discharge actions, deferring to the New York legislature. Murphy v. American Home Prods. Co., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232
(1983).
24. See, eg., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164
Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (allowing cause of action to employee discharged for refusal to participate in employer's price rigging scheme); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d
311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981) (cause of action for discharge without just cause of employee
with good work record and 32 years of service); Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (discharge for refusal to commit perjury
held actionable); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471,427 A.2d 385 (1980)
(allowing suit by employee discharged for insisting on employer's compliance with health
regulations); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ml1.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876
(1981) (granting cause of action to employee discharged for reporting possible criminal
activity of fellow worker to police); Kesay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353
(1978) (employee discharged for filing worker's compensation claim allowed cause of action); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (employee terminated by employer seeking to avoid payment of sales commission permitted
cause of action); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976) (employee fired in effort to discover theft allowed cause of action); Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (discharge for refusing foreman's sexual advances
held actionable); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (discharge for serving
jury duty held actionable); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (cause
of action for bank employee discharged for insisting on employer's compliance with consumer protecton laws).
25. See infra notes 53-103 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Larson v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (Ct. App. 1977)
(although discharge for refusal to take "psychological stress evaluation" test similar to lie
detector test did not violate public policy, discharge for absence from employment for voting, jury duty, or national guard duty may have sufficed); Geary v. United States Steel
Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974) (consumer protection policy exception to terminable at will rule not recognized because no violation of clear mandate of public policy was
established); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977) (only
exercise of statutory right or refusal to engage in criminal activity would support public
policy exception).
27. See, eg., Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977) (at will
doctrine may not be overridden by something so nebulous as public policy); see also Ivy v.
Army Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas
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Recognition of Wrongful Discharge

Courts recognizing wrongful discharge actions advance sound
policy arguments for their position. A generally illustrative case is
Petermann v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, 8 in which
an employee was discharged for refusing to perjure himself.29 In
holding that public policy would be violated if employers were
permitted absolute freedom to discharge employees, the
Petermann court stated:
It would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary
to sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any employee ... on the ground that he declined to commit perjury,
an act specifically enjoined by statute ....
To hold otherwise
would
be
without
reasons
and
contrary
to
the spirit of the
30
law.
Courts allowing wrongful discharge actions also have addressed the inferior bargaining postion of the employee in the employment relationship, the employee's need for job security, and
the modern economic atmosphere.31 Moreover, the courts not
only are concerned with protecting the at will employee from arbi-

trary dismissal, but also are interested in limiting protection when
other significant interests are involved. Specifically, courts may
consider the appropriateness of legislative rather than judicial action,32 the importance of the public interest alleged,33 and the relative weight of the employee and employer interests involved.3 4

Significantly, courts recognizing wrongful discharge do not ignore
or overrule the terminable at will doctrine, but find an exception
on the facts of the particular case.35
A number of jurisdictions reject wrongful discharge actions in
Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981); Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1981); Maus v. National Living Centers, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982).
28. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
29. Id. at 187, 344 P.2d at 26.
30. Id. at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27.
31. See infra notes 55-96 and accompanying text.
32. Some courts, in deference to the legislature, have been reluctant to allow wrongful
discharge actions. See, e.g., Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1981). This reluctance is not shared by courts holding that public policy should be
protected by the judiciary. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 InI. 2d 172, 181, 384
N.E.2d 353, 357 (1978).
33. See infra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 105-43 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 218, 536 P.2d 512, 517 (1975) (generally,
absent legislation or employment contract, employer can discharge employee or employee
can quit at any time and for any reason, but under certain circumstances employer who
discharges with socially undesirable motive is responsible for injury done).
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specific factual settings but indicate that other circumstances may
lead to a different outcome.3 6 For example, in Geary v. United
States Steel Corp.,3 an employee was discharged for informing
his supervisor of the safety hazards of a product manufactured by
the employer. 38 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to recognize the employee's wrongful discharge claim, holding that "no
clear mandate of public policy [was] violated."'39 The court indicated, however, that a cause of action may be recognized when an
established public policy is threatened by the discharge of an at
will employee.'
Even courts that refuse to recognize wrongful discharge actions4" address the weight of contrary opinion. In Whittaker v.
Care-More, Inc. ,4 two nursing home employees brought suit
against their employer alleging termination without good cause as
a breach of their employment contract and "retaliatory discharge"
as an independent tort.4 3 In rejecting the claim, the court, while
noting that other jurisdictions recognize exceptions to the at will
rule, deferred to the legislature.' The court expressed concern
that the foundation of the free enterprise system could be jeopardized by such a drastic change in the common law and stated that a
detailed analysis of the probable effect on commerce should predate any change.45 In Ivy v. Army Times Publishing Co.,' an
employee filed a wrongful discharge claim against his employer
alleging that he was discharged solely because he testified truthfully, but against his employer's interests, in an administrative
hearing.4 7 The court affirmed a panel decision refusing to recognize wrongful discharge. 48 A strong dissent argued that the question presented was of "exceptional importance" and that the
majority's terse disposal of the issue flew "in the face of that substantial body of scholarly commentary and decisional law sup36. See supra note 26.
37. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
38. Id. at 173-74, 319 A.2d at 175.
39. Id. at 185, 319 A.2d at 180.
40. Id. at 184, 319 A.2d at 180.
41. See supra note 27.
42. 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
43. Id. at 395.
44. Id. at 396.
45. Id.
46. 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981).
47. Id. at 832. The employer had conceded that he discharged the employee because
of his testimony. Id.
48. Id. at 831.
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porting the recognition of either a tort or contract cause of action
for an at will employee."4 9
Wrongful discharge exceptions to the terminable at will rule
are consistent with both public policy5" and modem economic

conditions."

Unfortunately, however, wrongful discharge is yet

to be accepted by a majority of jurisdictions, and where accepted,
is often inconsistently applied.
B.

Tort or Contract?

Two approaches have evolved in jurisdictions allowing wrongful discharge actions. Courts recognize suit for breach of contract
or hold that wrongful discharge is an independent tort.52 The distinctions between tort and contract actions, however, are not always clear. Similar factual situations may present an issue in
either contract or tort, or both.53 Generally, tort and contract actions can be distinguished by the nature of the duty involved; tort
duties are imposed by law, while contractual duties arise from
agreement.54
49. Id. at 834.
50. See infra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.
5 1. The development of capitalism has left individuals increasingly vulnerable to private economic power. The employer-employee relationship best illustrates this phenomenon. Because an employee's livelihood depends on his ability to earn wages, the employer
possesses a significant economic advantage that poses a threat to employee freedom. This
advantage is further magnified as economic power becomes increasingly concentrated in
the hands of fewer employers. Labor unions are one mechanism to limit this advantage; the
growth of labor unions at least partially offset the economic inequality of employers and
employees. However, a significant number of employment relationships are not covered by
collective bargaining agreements. In these relationships, the terminable at will rule traditionally governs, and the powerful employer retains an unconscionable economic advantage. Thus, the terminable at will rule, once necessary to foster economic growth, is
inconsistent with modem economic conditions and deleterious to the growth of employee
power. See Blades, supra note 10, at 1404-06.
52. As of this writing Alaska, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin recognize a contract
action while Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Oregon, and West Virginia
recognize a tort action. California, Massachusetts, and New Jersey recognize both.
53. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., I ll Cal. App. 3d 443, 455-56, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 722, 729 (1980) (permitting an action in contract and indicating that the facts
presented an issue in either contract or tort); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J.
58, 72-73, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980) (allowing a tort action, but noting that a contract action
might be equally appropriate).
54. In distinguishing tort from contract actions, the court in Malone v. University of
Kan. Medical Center, 220 Kan. 371, 374, 552 P.2d 885, 888 (1980), stated:
A breach of contract may be said to be a material failure of performance of a
duty arising under or imposed by agreement. A tort, on the other hand, is a
violation of a duty imposed by law, a wrong independent of contract. Torts can,
of course, be committed by parties to a contract. The question to be determined
here is whether the actions or omissions complained of constitute a violation of
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1. The Contract Theory
Courts finding that a wrongful discharge action arises in contract look to several factors. The first is the nature of the employment contract. Traditionally, contracts for an indefinite duration
are presumed to be at will, terminable at any time by either
party.5 5 Some courts, however, have held that the employer's
right to terminate is not absolute, 5 6 but that both parties to the
contract are bound by an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.57 The covenant is breached when an employer discharges an at will employee in bad faith, with malice, or with retaliatory motives.5 8
In Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. 59 an employee discharged for
rebuffing her supervisor's sexual advances was allowed to sue her
employer for breach of an oral employment contract, although the
contract was for an indefinite time. The court reasoned that
neither the public good nor the economic system is served by permitting terminations motivated by bad faith, malice, or retaliation.6" The Monge court carefully noted that it was not overruling
the terminable at will rule, but was recognizing an exception
based on changing legal, social, and economic conditions.6 Similarly, in Fortune v. National Cash Register Co. ,62 the court held
that an employee working under a written contract was protected
by an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, despite a
specific provision for termination at will by either party on written
notice.6 3 The plaintiff in Fortune alleged that he was dismissed to
prevent his collection of sales commissions.' The court held that
the dismissal was in bad faith, amounting to a breach of the emduties imposed by law, or of duties arising by virtue of the alleged express agreement between the parties.
55. See supra note 1.
56. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 321-22, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917,
922 (1981); Patterson v. Philco Corp., 252 Cal. App. 2d 63, 65, 60 Cal. Rptr. 110, 111
(1967); see also Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 101-02, 364 N.E.2d
1251, 1256 (1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551
(1974).
57. See Monge, 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551;see also Fortune, 373 Mass. at 101,
364 N.E.2d at 1255-56; Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Alaska 1983).
58. MAonge, 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
59. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
60. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
61. Id. at 132-33, 316 A.2d at 551-52.
62. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 99-100, 364 N.E.2d at 1254.
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ployment contract. 65
Courts adopting the contract theory also consider the express
or implied terms of the employment agreement.66 These terms
may involve the length of employment,67 representations made by
69
the employer in personnel policies 68 or an employee handbook,
statements made by the employer during the employment interview, 70 or the employee's work record. 7 ' In Pugh v. See's Candies,
Inc. ,72 the plaintiff had worked for thirty-two years for the employer, advancing from dishwasher to vice president and member
of the board of directors.73 The company president had assured
plaintiff that if he was loyal and hardworking his future with the
company would be secure.74 Plaintiff had never received formal
or written criticism of his work, nor had he ever been denied a
raise or bonus. 75 Based on the totality of the parties' relationship,
the court found that the company had impliedly agreed not to discharge its employees arbitrarily. 76 The plaintiff in Pugh was permitted to maintain a wrongful discharge action for breach of that
agreement.77 In Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,78 the court held

that the employee's eighteen years of satisfactory service and the
employer's expressed policy involving the adoption of specific
procedures for settling employment disputes precluded the employer from discharging without good cause.79 The court allowed
the discharged employee to recover against the employer for
breach of this implied contractual term. 0
65. Id. at 104-05, 364 N.E.2d at 1257.
66. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981);
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 2d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
67. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 324, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
68. Cleary, Ill Cal. App. 3d at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
69. Compare Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 54, 551 P.2d 779,
782 (1976) (company manual providing for discharge only with just cause did not constitute express or implied contract for a definite term), with Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57
N.Y.2d 458, 465-66, 443 N.E.2d 441, 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (1982) (company manual
coupled with other assurances by employer regarding discharge created question for trial
whether employer bound to discharge employee only with just cause).
70. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
71. Id.; Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
72. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
73. Id. at 316, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 918-19.
74. Id. at 317, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
75. Id. at 317-18, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
76. Id. at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
77. Id.
78. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
79. Id. at 455-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
80. Id.

WRIGHT LINE AND WRONGFUL DISCHARGE

1983]

Finally, some courts hold that the right to discharge an employee under a terminable at will contract is limited by considera-

tions of public policy."1 These courts find an implied contractual
provision protecting an employee from discharge for refusing to
act contrary to public policy." In the recent case of Brockmeyer v.

Dunn & Bradstreet, 3 an employee was dismissed after admitting
to having an affair with his secretary and having smoked marijuana. The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized wrongful dis-

charge as a breach of contract action based on an implied
provision that an employer will not discharge an employee for refusing to violate the clear mandate of public policy.8 4 On the facts
of the case, however, the court held that the discharge did not
violate a public policy reflected in the constitution or statutes of

Wisconsin.

5

The damage issue is significant in wrongful discharge cases
under the contract theory. Damage awards generally are restricted to lost wages, commissions, and other earnings. In assess-

ing compensatory damages, courts also may consider lost benefits
such as stock options.8 6 Although evidence may indicate the bad
faith of the employer, punitive damages and damages for mental
81. See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d
25 (1959), where the court recognized that an employment contract of indefinite duration
generally is terminable at will by either party. In allowing the wrongful discharge action of
an employee who had refused to commit pejury, the Petermann court held that an employer's contractual right of discharge may be restricted by law for the good of the community. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27.
82. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.3d 505 (1980). The Pierce
court stated that an action based on the public policy exception to the terminable at will
rule may arise in either contract or tort, asserting that the "action in contract may be predicated on the breach of an implied provision that an employer will not discharge an employee for refusing to perform an act that violates a clear mandate of public policy," while
the "action in tort may be based on the duty of an employer not to discharge an employee
who refused to perform an act that is a violation of a clear mandate of public policy." Id.
at 72, 417 A.2d at 512. The court held that the plaintiff, discharged for refusing to continue
research on a controversial drug, failed to establish the requisite "violation of a clear mandate of public policy." Id. at 76, 417 A.2d at 514.
83. 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
84. Id. at 575-76, 335 N.W.2d at 841. The court considered the public policy exception under both tort and contract theories, adopting the latter because the remedies established by Wisconsin wrongful discharge statutes, reinstatement and backpay, were
considered appropriate only in contract actions. Id. The court expressly refused to imply a
covenant of good faith. Id. at 569, 335 N.W.2d at 838.
85. Id. at 579, 335 N.W.2d at 842.
86. See Ebling v. Masco Corp., 79 Mich. App. 531, 534-35, 261 N.W.2d 74, 76-77
(1977) (damage award of $300,000 not excessive in view of employer's stipulation that employee would have accrued stock options of $404,000 but for employer's breach of employment contract).
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pain and suffering normally are disallowed. At least one court has
held that punitive damages may be recovered only if the employee
proves that the employer was guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.87 Some courts have refused to account for pain and suffering
in the damage award. 88 Others have imposed a privity requirement, limiting standing to sue and recovery to the discharged
employee.89
The difficulty of defining contract terms and the limitations on
damage recovery are the primary weaknesses of the contract approach to wrongful discharge. Partially because of these deficiencies, the tort approach is the majority view.
2.

The Tort Theory

Courts recognizing wrongful discharge as a tort hold that
when the discharge is designed to prevent the employee's exercise
of a statutory right or require criminal behavior as a condition of
employment, the employer violates public policy and an exception
to the at will rule exists. 90 Discharge under such circumstances
87. In Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 445, 168 Cal. Rptr.
772, 774 (1980), the court indicated that an employee must overcome a difficult burden of
proof to recover punitive damages, citing Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d
809, 819, 598 P.2d 452,457, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482, 487 (1979) (showing of oppression, fraud, or
malice required for recovery of punitive damages).
88. See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 132, 316 A.2d 549, 552
(1974). The court ordered a jury verdict reduced by the amount attributable to damages
for pain and suffering, citing authority holding that such damages are not generally recoverable in a contract action. The Monge court limited plaintifis recovery to lost wages. Id.
89. See, e.g., Pstragowski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1977).
In Pstragowski, the wife of an employee alleging malicious discharge brought suit as a third
party beneficiary of her husband's employment contract. The court of appeals upheld the
district court's dismissal of her action because she did not have a reasonable expectation of
pecuniary benefit from her husband's continued employment and the legal wrong was
against the husband. Id. at 5.
90. For cases holding that a tort action is available to an at will employee whose
dismissal violates public policy, see, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d
1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (discharge for failure to submit to polygraph test); McNulty v. Borden,
Inc., 474 F. Supp. 111 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (refusal to cooperate in alleged antitrust violation
led to termination); Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1970)
(engaging attorney to act as representative in negotiating terms and conditions of employment resulted in discharge); Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, 192 Cal. App. 2d 793,
13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961) (termination for engaging in union activity); Kelsay v. Motorola,
Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979) (dismissal for filing worker's compensation
claim); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385
(1978) (refusal to alter pollution control reports led to dismissal); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69
Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976) (discharge for filing worker's compensation claim);
Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (termination for accepting jury duty);
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (discharge for reporting employer's violations of consumer credit code).
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"violates a basic duty imposed by a law upon all employers," and
the aggrieved employee may maintain a tort action for wrongful
discharge against the employer.9 ' Unlike the inquiry in most con-

tract actions, the tort inquiry typically goes beyond the relationship of the parties, enabling courts to find that an employer
breaches a duty to uphold the public interest by wrongfully discharging an employee.
In Palmateer v. InternationalHarvester Co. ,92 the court relied
on the public policy exception to the terminable at will rule to
recognize wrongful discharge as a tort. In Palmateer, the complaint alleged simply that the plaintiff was a former employee of
defendant, discharged for reporting the possible criminal activity
of a fellow employee to the police.9 3 Holding that the complaint
stated a cause of action, the majority stated that "[alli that is required is that the employer discharge the employee in retaliation
for the employee's activities, and that the discharge be in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy." 94 The court found
enforcement of the state's criminal code to be the clearly mandated public policy violated by the discharge. 95 A critical dissent
urged that a wrongful discharge cause of action should lie "only
when the discharge has been violative of some strong public policy that has been clearly articulated." 96
The imprecise definitional limits of public policy have engendered criticism, 97 but operate in fact to facilitate decisionmaking

by providing flexibility. This flexibility is generally not enjoyed
91. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 178, 610 P.2d 1330, 1337, 164
Cal. Rptr. 839, 846 (1980).
92. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
93. Id. at 127, 421 N.E.2d at 877.
94. Id. at 134, 421 N.E.2d at 881.
95. Id. at 132-33, 421 N.E.2d at 879-80. According to the majority, "there is a clear
public policy favoring the investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses" and "[t]he
law is feeble indeed if it permits [an employer] to take matters into its own hands by retaliating against its employees who cooperate in enforcing the law." Id. at 133-34, 421 N.E.2d
at 880.
96. Id. at 145, 421 N.E.2d at 885 (emphasis in original).
97. See, e.g., Hinrichs v. Tranquilare Hosp. 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Ala. 1977) (public
policy "is too nebulous a standard" to justify modification of the at will rule); Palmateer v.
International Harvester Co., 85 II1. 2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981) (definition of
public policy is the "Achilles heel" of the tort theory). The court in Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 188, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959), recognized that
"'public policy is a vague expression, and few cases can arise in which its application may
not be disputed."' (quoting Noble v. City of Palo Alto, 89 Cal. App. 47, 50, 264 P. 529, 530
(1928)). The Petermann court adopted the definition of Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks
Int'l Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 567, 575, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (1953), stating that public policy is "[a]
principle of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be
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by courts bound by the strictures of the contract theory. 98 The
greater flexibility of the tort approach is also reflected in the scope
of damage remedies-the full range of tort damages, including
punitive damages, are available to discharged employees who establish a public policy exception.9 9 For example, when an employee has been discharged for exercising a statutory right, such as
filing for worker's compensation, courts may impose punitive
damages. °° Courts also stress the deterrent aspects of punitive
damages in holding that employers cannot act contrary to the
Dampublic interest by claiming a right to terminate at will.'

ages for mental pain and suffering typically are permitted where
the pain and suffering flows from the employer's malicious behavior in effecting the discharge. °2 Finally, recovery is not restricted
to the discharged employee but extends to an affected spouse.' 3
174 Cal. App. 2d at 188, 344 P.2d
injurious to the public or against the public good.
at 27.
98. Courts adhering to the contract theory based on considerations fpublicpolicy do
enjoy this flexibility. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.
2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). The
Kelsay court held that the plaintiff was entitled to compensatory damages and addressed
the issue of punitive damage for malicious, intentional, or grossly negligent conduct in
wrongful discharge cases, holding that they could be awarded in subsequent cases presenting similar facts. Id. at 186-90, 384 N.E.2d at 359-61.
2d at 187, 384 N.E.2d at 359-60; Lally v. Copygraphics, 173
100. See Kelsay, 74 I11.
N.J. Super. 162, 180-81, 413 A.2d 960, 969 (App. Div. 1980); Brown v. Transcon Lines,
284 Or. 597, 613-14, 588 P.2d 1087, 1095 (1978).
101. The Kelsay court emphasized that punitive damages would both punish and serve
as a warning and an example to deter employers from committing acts such as discharging
employees who file worker's compensation claims. 74 Ill.
2d at 186-88, 384 N.E.2d at
359-60. The court noted that imposition of exemplary damages is appropriate in actions
based on a separate and independent tort rather than a breach of contract. Id. at 187, 384
N.E.2d at 360.
102. See Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976). TheAgir
court allowed damages for mental pain and suffering arising from a summary dismissal.
Plaintiff was discharged when defendant restaurant, attempting to uncover a theft, began
dismissing its waitresses in alphabetical order. Id. at 141, 355 N.E.2d at 317. The Agis
court did not focus on public policy but instead based its award for pain and suffering on
findings that the act of discharge was extreme and outrageous and that the employer intentionally or recklessly caused the infliction of severe emotional distress. Id. at 144-45, 355
N.E.2d at 318-19; see also Keller, Ackland & Glad, The Evolving Doctrine of Wrongful
Termination of Employment PracticalConsiderationsRegardingEmployment andInsurance
Agent Relationships, 32 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 105 (1982) (cautioning employers against
harassing an undesirable employee into quitting because of possible tort liability independent of wrongful discharge).
103. In Agis, 371 Mass. at 146-47, 355 N.E.2d at 319-21, plaintiff's husband successfully brought suit and recovered damages for loss of consortium.
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II.

THE COMPETING INTERESTS

It is evident that the judiciary recognizes the inadvisability of
completely abolishing the common law terminable at will rule.
By reaffmning the rule in words and finding a multitude of exceptions in fact, however, courts have diminished its vitality as a legal
concept. The ideal approach would involve balancing the interests of the employee, the employer, and society.' °4 In reality,
however, neither employee nor employer interests have been addressed adequately by the courts. As a result, employers are disadvantaged and employees harmed by a judicial construct
designed to protect employee interests.
A.

Developing the ProtectedInterest

Although courts apparently are willing to consider a wide variety of factual settings under the general rubric of wrongful discharge, they are not willing to grant a cause of action to every
discharged employee. Standards of protected employee conduct
vary significantly, although some behavior is deemed particularly
worthy of judicial protection.
Where the employee is discharged for exercising his civic
rights, duties, and responsibilities, courts have little trouble finding that a wrongful discharge has occurred.10 5 Reasoning that an
employer's authority over employees does not include the right to
demand criminal behavior"' and that employees should not be
forced to choose between criminal sanctions and continued employment, 0 7 courts have recognized wrongful discharge claims

when employees are discharged for refusing to perjure themselves, 0 8 participate in a violation of the antitrust laws, 0 9 or vio-

late various health, safety,

and consumer protection

104. See infra notes 144-89 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 24 & 90-96 and accompanying text.
106. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839 (1980). The court held that an employer cannot discharge an employee for refusing to
engage in criminal activity at the employer's request. Id. at 178, 610 P.2d at 1336-37, 164
Cal. Rptr. at 846.
107. Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 480, 427 A.2d 385, 389
(1980).
108. See, e.g., Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344
P.2d 25 (1959) (discharge for refusal to give false testimony before legislative committee).
But see, e.g., Ivy v. Army Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981). The majority
refused to recognize wrongful discharge when an employee was dismissed in retaliation for
giving truthful testimony before the District of Columbia Wage and Hour Board. A dissent argued that the practical effect of the decision was to encourage perjury. Id. at 832.
109. See, eg., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164
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0
regulations. 11

The employee who demonstrates years of good and faithful

service to the employer and alleges that his discharge was arbitrary or designed to deprive him of commissions,"' stock options, 11 2 or pension benefits' 1 3 also presents a favorable case. In
allowing a cause of action in these situations, courts protect the4

integrity of the employment contract and its implied provisions. 1
Typically, unprotected activities are those involving the internal management of a company. Reasoning that a company must
maintain autonomous control over the management of its internal
affairs, courts have denied a cause of action to "whistleblowers,"

individuals who publicize the wrongful activities of their employers."15 Thus, an employee who informed a supervisor that another
supervisor was soliciting and receiving kickback payments from
the employer's suppliers was denied a wrongful discharge cause of
action,1 16 as was an employee who attempted to correct, both publicly and within the corporation, allegedly fraudulent statements
made by the employer regarding construction of new plants.'
Arguably, these courts are concerned not only with preserving
Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (discharge for refusal to participate in employer's illegal scheme to fix
gasoline prices).
110. See, e.g., O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (Law Div. 1978)
(discharge of X-ray technician for refusing to perform catheterizations in violation of state
statute regulating practice of medicine); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn.
471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (termination for efforts to ensure that employer's products complied with labeling and licensing requirements of state food, drug, and cosmetic act);
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (employee's attempts to require
employer's compliance with state and federal consumer protection laws led to dismissal).
Ill. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
112. Ebling v. Masco Corp., 79 Mich. App. 531, 261 N.W.2d 74 (1977).
113. Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
114. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
115. But see Comment, Protectingthe Private Sector At Will Employee Who "Blows the
Whistle" A Cause ofAction Based Upon DeterminantsofPublicPolicy, 1977 Wis. L. REV.
777. According to the author, the responsible whistleblower should be viewed as acting in
the public's best interest by exposing employer activity contravening expressed and sanctioned norms of social behavior. Id. at 778-79. The author contends that extending the
public policy exception to protect whistleblowers is consistent with the philosophy that a
citizen has a societal obligation to prevent others from engaging in illegal behavior. Id. at
805-811. The author also notes that the definition of whistleblower in the wrongful discharge context need not be limited to employees who publicize the wrongful activities of
their employers; it also may include those who internally expose wrongful activity or seek
to obtain rather than disclose information. Id at 799 n.151.
116. Martin v. Platt, 179 Ind. App. 688, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (1979).
117. Percival v. General Motors Corp., 400 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Mo. 1975), af'd, 539
F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976).
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managerial discretion, but also with the distinct possibility of employee malice.

Where employee interests are purely private, courts also are
reluctant to allow wrongful discharge actions. One court denied a
cause of action where an employee alleged that he was discharged
for requesting to examine the employer's books and records as a
stockholder in the corporation.11 8 The court stated that the statu-

tory right of inspection is not based on public policy but on protecting the private and proprietary interests of stockholders as
owners of the corporation.' 19 Employees discharged for attending
night school'2 0 and for expressing political beliefs 12' also have
been denied a cause of action. In these situations, the employer

may exercise his absolute right to terminate an at will employee.
Clearly, while courts have retreated from rigid adherence to

the terminable at will rule, they will not grant relief to every disgruntled employee who complains of wrongful discharge. The
difficulty arises in defining exactly which employee interests deserve protection. Case law establishes the parameters of protected
conduct, but the definition is often unclear and inconsistent.
B. Articulating the Employer's Interest
In wrongful discharge actions, the employer's interests should
provide a substantial counterweight to the protected interest of the
employee. The terminable at will rule was actually designed to
safeguard employers' freedom of contract by allowing the unimpeded movement of employees in the marketplace.12 2 Although
118. Campbell v. Ford Indus., 274 Or. 243, 546 P.2d 141 (1976).
119. Id at 249-50, 546 P.2d at 145-46.
120. Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
121. Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct.
1978), a~'d mena, 70 A.D. 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160, appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 421
N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1979). However, the Chin court simply may have been reacting to the
violence of the plaintiffs expression-driving a van into a crowd at a political rally.
122. The terminable at will rule arose with the advent of the industrial revolution. It
displaced a medieval common law master-servant theory that substantially protected the
servant's interest in maintaining employment. The economics of the late nineteenth century, however, gave rise to the laissez-faire theory of government. Courts subscribed to this
theory, reasoning that economic growth would be encouraged by minimal legislative and
judicial control over trade and industry. The terminable at will rule, based on the employer's "fundamental right" to discharge employees as he pleased, was a corollary to the
laissez-faire theory. It was thought that insulating employers from the risks normally assodated with employing workers also would facilitate economic growth. See Note, supra
note 9, at 1824-28; Note, Recognizing the Employee's Interests in Continued Employment-The California Cause ofAction for Unjust Dismissal, 12 PAc. L.J. 69, 72-74 (1980);
Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. Rav. 335, 340-343 (1973).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:404

changed social and economic conditions support modification of
the traditional rule, employers retain strong and compelling interests that courts should consider carefully in deciding wrongful discharge cases. These interests may be primarily economic or may

purely involve personnel choices. Unfortunately, employers' interests generally have not been articulated by courts recognizing
23
wrongful discharge actions.
Indiscriminate recognition of wrongful discharge actions could
chill the employers' practice of taking risks by hiring unproven

employees. The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Fortune v. National Cash Register Co. 124 recognized that the uncertainties of the
business world compel flexibility in decisionmaking-employers
necessarily require substantial control over hiring and discharge.125 Similarly, in Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 126 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that employers have a legitimate interest in employing and maintaining the best personnel
available,' 27 and that the threat of wrongful discharge suits could
28

inhibit employers from making critical personnel decisions.

Personnel decisions are inevitably subjective.129 The qualities
of a good employee, particularly in management positions, are
often incapable of precise definition. 30 For this reason, employers frequently are willing to hire unproven employees. If the employee fails to fulfill the employer's expectations, termination

without liability results under the terminable at will rule. Under
the current judicial modifications of the rule, however, employers
faced with the possibility of suit by every discharged employee,
may be unwilling to take a chance on unproven employees.
123. Some courts have at least acknowledged employer interests. See, e.g., Palmateer
v. International Harvester Co., 85 Il. 2d 124, 129, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981) (interest in
running business efficiently and profitably); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130,
133, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974) (interest in running business as employer sees fit). Commentators have articulated the dangers of ignoring employer interests in wrongful discharge
actions. See, e.g., Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will-Have the CourtsForgotten
the Employer?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 201 (1982) (arguing that courts should narrowly define
the public policy exception to the at will rule, deferring to legislatures to strike the proper
balance between the interests of employer, employee, and society).
124. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
125. Id. at 101-02, 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
126. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
127. Id. at 181, 319 A.2d at 179.
128. Id. at 181-82, 319 A.2d at 179.
129. See Note, supra note 123, at 229.
130. Blades, supra note 10, at 1428-29. Professor Blades warns that the employees
evaluation of the employee is usually highly personalized and intuitive, and therefore particularly difficult to translate into concrete terms that a juror can readily appreciate. Id.
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Retention of unproductive employees is another employer
concern that may be affected by an employee bias in wrongful
discharge actions. The court in Palmateer v. InternationalHarvester Co. 131 acknowledged that an employer has a legitimate interest in running his business efficiently and profitably.
Maintaining unproductive employees on the payroll creates inefficiency which, however, the employer may decide to absorb simply
to avoid the time, expense, and adverse publicity involved in defending a wrongful discharge action. Further, by effectively denying employers the right to fire unproductive employees, courts
which allow wrongful discharge actions could seriously reduce
their state's attractiveness to new business. 13 2 Several courts have
noted the negative impact that recognizing
wrongful discharge ac133
economy.
state's
a
on
have
might
tions
Employee morale also may be undermined by overly broad
exceptions to the terminable at will rule. The Geary court remarked that "even an unusually gifted person may be of no use to
his employer if he cannot work effectively with fellow employees." 134 Since an unusually gifted employee probably will present
an effective case for wrongful discharge, the employer may retain
the employee even if the best decision is termination. Fellow employees could be adverely affected by this practice, resulting in a
disaffected work force. When a terminated employee successfully
recovers damages in a wrongful discharge action, the impact on
employee morale also is potentially devastating; employees may
reason that model behavior is financially less rewarding than behavior that leads to discharge.
The threat of vexatious lawsuits is substantial because the
standards governing wrongful discharge actions are vague. Since
courts have indicated a willingness to hear a wide variety of cases,
discharged employees are alert to the strong possibility of recovery, which may include punitive damages if the action is brought
in tort.' 3 5 Furthermore, juries tend to identify with and therefore
131. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 129, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981).
132. See Note, supra note 123, at 230-31; see also Comment, "Just Cause" Termination
RightsforAt Will Employees, 1982 DET. C.L. REv. 591, 617-18 (expressing concern that
liberal wrongful discharge legislation pending before the Michigan legislature might force

employers to relocate).
133. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 143, 421 N.E.2d 876,
885 (1981) (Ryan and Moran, J.J., dissenting); Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d

395, 396-97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
134. 456 Pa. at 182-83, 319 A.2d at 179.
135. See Note, supra note 123, at 228-29.
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favor employees.136 Thus, the disgruntled employee has little to
lose and much to gain by instituting a wrongful discharge action.
The possibility of a flood of unwarranted litigation resulting from
a vaguely defined public policy exception was raised in Pierce v.
Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp.,137 where the court stated that the
public policy
exception should be narrowly defined to avoid this
38
problem.

1

Finally, the time and expense of defending a wrongful discharge action can be extreme. The corporate giant may be able to
bear the cost, but it will likely be reflected in higher prices or reduced wages. The small business may find the imposition of a
judgment staggering, particularly if punitive damages are
awarded. 39 In addition, attempts by employers to spread the risk
of wrongful discharge liability with insurance may not be successful. A case indicating that employers may obtain limited insurance coverage is Howard v. Russel Stover Candies, Inc., 40 where

the court imposed on an insurer the duty to defend and possibly
indemnify an employer in a wrongful discharge action. This case
does not have broad application, however; the court held only
that the employer's nonwillful failure to send a statutorily required termination letter to a discharged employee was covered
by a comprehensive general liability policy.' 4 ' In the typical
wrongful discharge case, coverage would probably be denied
based on the strong public policy against
insurance coverage for
42
intentional acts or punitive damages.'
Guarding against the mere possibilty of wrongful discharge
actions also may involve considerable time and expense. Employers must spend more time in the personnel selection process, attempting to recognize candidates likely to bring suit upon
termination. To assure some measure of protection against suit,
employers may use written employment contracts or employee
43
handbooks containing written statements of personnel policies.'
136. See Blades, supra note 10, at 1428.
137. 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
138. Id. at 73, 417 A.2d at 512-13.
139. See Note, supra note 123, at 230 (most commentators analyzing wrongful discharge actions improperly focus on employees of corporate giants while ignoring the plight
of small business).
140. 649 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1981).
141. Id.
142. See Keller, Ackland & Glad, supra note 102, at 107 n.2.
143. Id. at 114. The authors suggest that employers adopt certain practical measures to
avoid wrongful discharge claims. They caution against "puffing" in the employment inter-
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The expense of drafting and printing these items may be considerable, however, particularly if expert assistance is required. Again,
these expenses ultimately will be reflected in price increases or

wage reductions. Employee benefits also may be cut, as personnel
budgets expand to cover the increased cost of selecting, hiring,
and discharging employees. Employees not directly harmed by
loss of benefits will be injured indirectly as consumers of higher
priced goods.
III. A UNIFORM STANDARD OF REVIEW
The current state of the law governing wrongful discharge ac-

tions is uncertain.'" The traditional terminable at will rule probably will continue to be modified by judicially defined public
policy exceptions and contract considerations. The manner in
which the modifications are defined and applied vary considerainconsistency disadvantages both employer
bly and the resulting
145
and employee.
Adopting a uniform standard of review for wrongful discharge
actions will remedy the inconsistencies in theory and application.
146
The standard must take into account the interests of employee,
employer, 147 and society."' To balance these different and sometimes competing interests, adoption of a modified version of the

test espoused by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in°
Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc. ,14 is appropriate.1
The Wright Line test is recognized by courts 15 1 as providing a

view and suggest use of written employment contracts and a written statement of employment policies, including a policy on discharge.
144. See supra notes 23-103 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 105-43 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 105-21 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 122-43 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
149. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (lst Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 989 (1982); see infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
150. See infra notes 167-89 and accompanying text.
151. A number of federal courts of appeals have expressly approved the Wright Line
analysis. See NLRB v. Senftner Volkswagen Corp., 681 F.2d 557, 560 (8th Cir. 1982);
NLRB v. Charles H. McCauley Assoc., 657 F.2d 685, 688 (5th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Lloyd
A. Fry Roofing Co., 651 F.2d 442, 446 (6th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Nevis Indus., Inc., 647
F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1981). The First, Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits have refused
to adopt Wright Line in its pure form. See NLRB v. New York Univ. Medical Center, 702
F.2d 284, 293 (2d Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Webb Ford, Inc., 689 F.2d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 1982);
Behring Int'l, Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 83, 88 (3rd Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S.Ct. 3104 (1983);
Wright Line, A Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d 899, 904 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 989 (1982). Recently, the Supreme Court resolved the split among the circuits by
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clear standard of review for discriminatory discharge actions, an
discharge, was characterized
area of labor law that, like wrongful
52

by uncertainty and inconsistency.1

A. Background of Wright Line
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects the right
of employees to engage in collective activity.' 53 Specifically, section 7 of the NLRA defines permissible collective activities' 54 and
sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) prohibit interference with the exercise
of section 7 rights and discriminatory hiring and firing practices
which encourage or discourage union membership. 55 These provisions safeguard the employee from disciplinary action or dismissal arising out of union activity or sympathy. The NLRB hears

complaints brought under sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) alleging that
animus was the motivating factor in an
an employer's anti-union
56
employee's discharge.
Prior to the formulation of the Wright Line test, an ongoing
battle raged between the courts of appeals and the NLRB over the
standard to be used in resolving cases where an employer's motive
explicitly approving the Wright Line test. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.,
103 S.Ct. 2469, 2474-75 (1983).
152. See Note, Wright Line: An End to the Duel Over Dual Motivation?, 32 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 237, 241-48 (1981).
153. National Labor Relations Act §§ 7-8, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (1976).
154. Section 7 grants "employees. . . the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively . . . and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection." 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
155. Section 8(a)(1) states that an employer may not "interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)
(1976). Section 8(a)(3) provides that an employer may not "by discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment. . . encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). An employer who punishes an employee for
exercising section 7 rights violates § 8(a)(l). If union activity is involved, § 8(a)(3) may be
violated as well. Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressureby Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations.4ct, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1195, 1198 (1967). When an employer is accused
of violating these provisions, the National Labor Relations Board may issue a complaint
and conduct a hearing on the matter. NLRA § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976). If a violation is found by a preponderance of the evidence, the employer is subject to statutory
sanctions including reinstatement of the employee and payment of lost wages. Id. § 10(c),
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
156. The anti-union animus may be either the sole reason for the discharge or only part
of the reason. In a "pretext" case, the employer's allegations of good cause for discharge
mask purely discriminatory motives. If, however, the employer asserts a legitimate business justification for discharge and there is also evidence of anti-union animus, a "dual
motivation" case is presented. See Note, supra note 152, at 237-38.
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in discharging an employee was questioned. 57 Some courts were
dissatisfied with the Board's "in part" test, which held that any
evidence of anti-union motive established a violation of section
8(a)(1) or 8(a)(3) of the Act.' 5 8 These courts considered the test to
be too pro-labor and thus favored an approach that gave management more consideration. 59 The causation test announced by the
NLRB in Wright Line,160 providing for a balancing of the interests
of the employer and the employee, was a logical synthesis of the
conflicting approaches of the Board and the courts.
6
The Wright Line test requires that the General Counsel '
make a prima facie showing supporting the inference that protected employee conduct was a "motivating factor" in the employer's decision to discharge. The burden then shifts to the
employer to show that the discharge would have taken place ab-

sent protected conduct. The employer may absolutely rebut the
inference by establishing that the circumstances justified the discharge. The shifting burdens of proof allow both parties to present their case with equal force.

To establish a prima facie case, the General Counsel must establish a nexus between the protected employee conduct and the
discharge.' 62 This can be done by submitting evidence of the em-

ployer's knowledge of the protected activity, his hostility towards
the employee, the timing of the discharge, and departure from the
usual disciplinary measures in similar situations.1 63 Evidence of
157. Id. at 241-48. The NLRA specifically grants the courts of appeals the power to
review NLRB decisions. NLRA § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1976). Section 10(f) grants
review power upon filing of a written petition requesting modification or setting aside of a
final Board order denying the relief sought.
158. Approximately half of the courts of appeals followed the in part test; the remainder applied a "dominant motive" or "but for" test. See Note, supra note 152, at 241-48
(discussing the various tests used by the circuits).
159. The First and Second Circuits, for example, favored a but for analysis, relying on
the Supreme Court's decision in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 287 (1977), that a school board must be given the opportunity to justify a discharge even though an unconstitutional consideration played a significant part in the
board's decision to terminate an employee. See Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v.
NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 97-99 (2d Cir. 1978); Colletti's Furniture, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d
1292, 1293-94 (Ist Cir. 1977). These courts applied the Mount Healthy analysis to actions
brought under the NLRA.
160. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 989 (1982).
161. The NLRB provides counsel for employees who allege discriminatory action by
employers. The General Counsel represents the employee and argues his case before the
Board.
162. See supra note 154.
163. See, e.g., Guerdon Indus., 255 N.L.R.B. 610, 617 (1981) (prima facie case estab-
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threats of reprisal or surveillance also will establish the necessary
nexus between the discharge and the protected activity-" 4
To rebut the inference presented by the employee's prima facie
case, the employer must show that the discharge would have occurred regardless of the protected behavior. Employers typically
present evidence of an employee's violation of plant rules or company policies, similar disciplinary action in prior cases, and an
employee's poor work record. 6 5 Significantly, employers need
not establish a complete absence of anti-union animus, but only
that the 66
same action would have been taken absent protected
conduct. 1
B. Application to Wrongful DischargeActions
A standard similar to the Wright Line test is appropriate for
judicial review of wrongful discharge cases. Both NLRB actions
alleging discriminatory discharge and wrongful discharge actions
involve the employment relationship, specifically, the termination
of employment. More significantly, wrongful discharge actions
and section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) actions similarly are predicated on
an employer's motive in discharging an employee.
Courts recognizing exceptions to the terminable at will rule
often wrestle with the question of whether the employer's motive
for the discharge has contravened a protected employee interest.' 67 Similarly, in section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) actions, the NLRB
fished by showing employer's knowledge of discharged employee's union activity); S. Alleghenies Disposal Serv., 256 N.L.R.B. 852, 852-53 (1981) (evidence that discharge
occurred two days after employees discussed union and obtained authorization cards sufficient to establish prima facie case); Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1090 (prima facie case
established by showing employer's hostility towards employee, timing of discharge, and
employer's unexplained departure from usual disciplinary procedures).
164. See, e.g., Russ Togs, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 767, 767 n.2 (1980) (prima facie case established by showing employer threats to dismiss employees engaging in union activities
and surveillance of employees going to union hall to file grievances).
165. See, e.g., Republic Die & Tool Co. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 463, 465 (6th Cir. 1982)
(evidence that employee violated numerous company rules, including one requiring use of
safety goggles); Liberty Men's Formals Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. 1303, 1306 (1981) (showing of
employee's failure to work required 40-hour week); Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 253
N.L.R.B. 871, 871-72 (1980), enforced, 660 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
997 (1982) (evidence of employee's tardiness and poor work attitude).
166. Under the Board's in part test, the slightest hint of anti-union animus was sufficient to taint the discharge. Even if the discharge served a legitimate business purpose, the
employer had to establish his exclusive reliance on it to rebut the inference of unlawful
motive. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. Under Wright Line, anti-union animus does not necessarily taint the discharge if the employer proves an independent cause
for termination.
167. See, e.g., Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 647, 245 N.W.2d 151, 153
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and the courts of appeals have considered whether an employee's
exercise of section 7 rights motivated the discharge. While section
7 rights are statutorily defined and employee rights in wrongful
discharge actions are judicially defined, both actions involve the
balancing of employee and employer interests and the evaluation
of employer motive. Because motive is a subjective element, it is
frequently difficult to determine how much weight it should be
given.168 A test similar to the Wright Line analysis provides a
the parties' interests may be
structured framework within which
69
considered.'
motive
and
weighed
To establish a violation in section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) actions, it
must first be demonstrated that the aggrieved employee's section 7
rights were violated by the discharge. By analogy, the employee
who alleges wrongful discharge must establish on the face of his
complaint that a protected interest was violated by the discharge.' 70 In wrongful discharge actions, the protected interest
can be drawn from decisional law. The selectivity of the judiciary
in allowing wrongful discharge actions and the rationales employed by the courts establish loose guidelines for the developThese guidelines are the basis of
ment of protected interests.'
the hierarchy of protected employee interests incorporated into
the proposed standard of review.
(1976) (employer is not free to discharge an employee when the reason is an intention to
contravene public policy); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549,
551 (1974) (holding that where termination is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on
retaliation, a cause of action for wrongful discharge will lie); see also Geary v. United
States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974). In Geary, the court stated that imposing wrongful discharge liability on the basis of motive is "on the frontier of the law of tort."
Id. at 177-78, 319 A.2d at 177 (quoting I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 4.10, at 336 (1956)). The Geary court indicated that where there is specific intent to cause
harm or accomplish an ulterior purpose, courts have recognized tortious conduct. Id. at
178, 319 A.2d at 177. The court analogized that if an employer has specific intent to harm
an employee or achieve some other proscribed goal by the discharge, the employee could
maintain wrongful discharge cause of action. Id.
168. See Blades, supra note 10, at 1427-29. The author states that any case which turns
on motive or subjective intent poses difficult factual questions. In cases of abusive dismissal, this is the most compelling argument against giving all disgruntled employees recourse
to the courts.
169. Id. Professor Blades also highlights the problems of pleading and proof raised by
motive-oriented discharge actions, adding that the average jury is unlikely to identify with
and believe the employer even where both sides present equally credible versions of the
facts. Id. at 1428.
170. Failure to allege facts establishing a protected interest would properly result in
dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Dismissing actions not based on a recognized protected interests at the complaint stage will
discourage vexatious lawsuits. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 106-21 and accompanying text.
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The highest level of protected interests are those based on civic
rights, duties, and responsibilities as articulated in state or federal
statutes. 172 By anchoring the public policy exception to legislatively declared interests, courts will avoid the criticism that they
are usurping the role of the legislature by implementing their own
notions of public policy.17 3 Because interests embodied in statutory enactments are societal interests that transcend the employment relationship, actions in which these interests are implicated
present the strongest case. The next level of protected interests
involve the contract relationship.1 74 Where an employee alleges
that express or implied terms of the employment agreement, such
as length of service, statements by the employer, and work record,
legitimately gave rise to an expectation of continued employment,
the complaint would state a cause of action. Expectations of continued employment can be drawn from contract law and based on
75
the mutual and reasonable beliefs of employer and employee.1
Where legislatively declared public policy is absent, where employee interests involve the internal management of the company, t 76 or where purely private interests are involved, 7 7 the
complaint properly would be dismissed.
Once a protected interest is established, the employee must
make a showing sufficient to support the inference that the interest
was a motivating factor in the discharge. The causal nexus can be
established by introducing evidence of the direct statements of the
employer, the timing of the discharge, the employer's knowledge
of the protected interest, the departure from usual disciplinary
practices, and the employer's antagonism toward the discharged
172. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text; see also Palmateer v. International
Harvester Co., 85 IlI. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (Ryan and Moran, J.J., dissenting).
Justice Ryan argued persuasively that "public policy is first and foremost a matter of legislative concern" and that the role ofjudicially declared public policy is at best questionable.
Id. at 136-37, 421 N.E.2d at 881-82. But see Rishel, RetaliatoryDischarge: A Broadened
Tort Through Statutory Analogy, 70 ILL. B.J. 454 (1982) (commenting on Palmateer and
favoring adoption of liberal wrongful discharge standard that would treat decisional law as
equal to statutory law).
173. Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (Ryan and Moran, J.J., dissenting). Justice Ryan bitterly concluded that no "employer should be compelled to defend a
tort action and possibly, be forced to pay a disgruntled employee compensatory, and possibly substantial, punitive damages because of a violation of some vague concept of public
policy that has never been articulated by anyone except four members of this court." Id. at
145, 421 N.E.2d at 886.
174. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
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employee.178 Some of these factors were present and apparently
considered by the court in Harless v. First National Bank.17 9
There, the employee was demoted immediately after he brought
evidence of violations of state and federal consumer credit and
protection laws to the attention of his superiors.' 80 He was subsequently subjected to harassment and threats and ultimately discharged shortly after he gave bank files to an auditor.' 8' Based on
these facts, the Harless court concluded that the employee had
made a sufficient showing that the firing was motivated by an intention to contravene public policy and thus held that82the complaint stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge.'
To rebut the employee's prima facie case, the employer must
establish that the discharge would have taken place absent the
protected activity. He cannot merely assert his right to terminate
at will if a protected activity is involved. Rather, under the exceptions to the terminable at will rule the absolute right of discharge
is limited, and the employer must justify his action.' 83
The employer's justifications may include many factors not
addressed in discriminatory discharge actions under the NLRA
because in wrongful discharge actions the arena of protected employee interests is more expansive. While management in section
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) actions typically presents evidence of plant policy, employee work records, and prior disciplinary action, 184 the
employer in a wrongful discharge action may assert any legitimate
interest that reasonably could influence his decision to discharge
the employee. This might include intangible interests such as employee morale

85

and risk-taking in personnel decisions,

86

as well

as tangible economic interests such as the preservation of a productive and efficient work force.' 87 Since the protected activity
178. These are factors traditionally used by the NLRB to determine the causal nexus
between the discharge and the protected activity in section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) actions. See
supra notes 163--64 and accompanying text.
179. 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.Va. 1978).
180. Id. at 272.
181. Id. at 272-73.
182. Id. at 275-76.
183. The terminable at will rule, allowing discharge "for good cause, for no cause or
even for cause morally wrong," Payne v. Western & Atlantic R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20
(1884), has been modified by judicial decisions so that "cause morally wrong" or no cause
will no longer justify an arbitrary dismissal. See supra notes 23-103 and accompanying
text.
184. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
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may have only partially motivated the discharge, the employer
may account for this in his rebuttal. The Wright Line test does not
require proof that discriminatory motive played no part in the disaccharge; it simply requires a showing that absent the protected
188
action.
same
the
taken
have
would
employer
the
tivity,
After the employer has presented his case, the employee may
rebut the employer's assertion of a legitimate business justification
with additional evidence of a retalitory motive.'89 The factfinder
will balance the strength of the employer's asserted interests with
the employee's protected interest. After any relevant societal interests have been taken into account, the judge or jury will determine whether a wrongful discharge has occurred.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Continued judicial modification of the traditional terminable
at will rule appears inevitable. As courts continue to carve out
exceptions to the rule, the number of wrongful discharge actions
will increase. The probable increase in litigation and the present
inconsistencies and confusion in this area of the law compel the
adoption of a uniform standard of judicial review. The standard
proposed in this Note provides a clear guide for the judiciary in
deciding wrongful discharge actions. Significantly, the proposed
standard will adequately safeguard the interests of society, the
employer, and the employee by providing an analytical framework within which the interests can be balanced. As a consequence of judicial adherence to this standard, inconsistency and
confusion will be transformed into uniformity and predictability
and both parties to an at will employment relationship will be the
beneficiaries of equitable results.
MARY TERESA SOBNOSKY
188. See supra note 158.
189. In Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1980), the

court stated that after both parties have presented their case, the employee "may attack the
employer's offered explanation, either on the ground that it is pretextual . . . or on the
ground that it is insufficient to meet the employer's obligations under contract or applicable
legal principles." Id. at 329-30, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927.

